Constitutional Law--Federal Loyalty Program--Summary Suspension Act Limited to Sensitive Positions by Schafer, William J., III
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1
1956
Constitutional Law--Federal Loyalty Program--
Summary Suspension Act Limited to Sensitive
Positions
William J. Schafer III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
William J. Schafer III, Constitutional Law--Federal Loyalty Program--Summary Suspension Act Limited to Sensitive Positions, 8 W. Res. L.
Rev. 98 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol8/iss1/12
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the res in a divorce proceeding is the marital status which either spouse
may dissolve when properly domiciled in the state hearing the cause, even
though the other spouse was given notice solely through constructive
service.11 The conclusion that Florida could not award alimony, since it
lacked personal jurisdiction over the non-resident spouse, was a further
adoption of the rationale in the Estm decisionj 2
It seems that the real significance of the present decision is that it
resolves the question as to whether one may receive an alimony judgment
after a divorce has been granted in another forum. In the sequence of
events, (unlike the Estm case, in which the wife had a prior support
order) Mrs. Armstrong procured her alimony decree subsequent to the
divorce. All three opinions give tacit approval to the validity of a later
alimony decree, despite the questionable language of the Estm decision,
in which the court emphasized the priority of Mrs. Estin's support order.
In view of the interests involved it appears that the results of this de-
cision are desirable. Ohio has a legitimate interest in all of its domicili-
aries which extends to their economic status and well-being. The indi-
vidual has an interest in due process of law with regard to decrees in
personam. In divorce proceedings injustice is more likely to result when
the parties are not acting in concert. This ruling tends to discourage one
marital partner from leaving the home with hopes of securing a divorce
in another state which would also discharge any alimony obligations.' 3
To hold otherwise because of the chronology of events would seem an
arbitrary disregard of rights. A recent New York decision, 4 adopting
the rationale of the Armstrong holding, cites the Armstrong case in up-
holding the constitutionality of a statute' 5 which allows a New York
court to grant a wife a support order subsequent to an ex parte divorce
obtained in another forum.
NORMAN S. JEAVONS
CONSTILTUTIONAL LAW -FEDERAL LOYALTY PROGRAM -
SUMMARY SUSPENSION ACT LIMITED TO SENSITIVE
POSITIONS
Petitioner Cole, a preference-eligible veteran, was employed in the
classified civil service as a food and drug inspector of the Department of
1 Estn v. Estn, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878);
1 A.L.R.2d 1423 (1948)
' It has been suggested that this general subject should be included within the scope
of federal jurisdicuon due to the increasing mobility of the population. See MAYE,
THE AMRiCAN LEGAL SYsTEM 52-53 (1955).
"
4 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 NE.2d 553 (1956).
"N.Y. CIvIL PRAcTicE Acr § 1170-b (1953). This statute was enacted after the
Estm case to protect a wife's support rights after a foreign divorce.
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Health, Education and Welfare. After an investigation pursuant to Ex-
ecutive Order 10450, which authorized the summary suspension of un-
reliable government employees, petitioner was suspended without pay
from his position with the government. He was charged with maintain-
ing a dose association with individuals reported to be Communists and
maintaining a sympathetic association with the Nature Friends of
America, an organization listed by the Attorney General as subversive.
Petitioner refused to exercise his right to answer the charges or request
a hearing. Then, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, upon a determination that petitioner's employment was not
dearly consistent with the interest of national security, terminated that
employment.
The Civil Service Commission declined to accept petitioner's appeal
under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act1 holding that the act was
not applicable to dismissals under the Summary Suspension Act of 1950.?
Petitioner then filed a civil action in the District Court for the District
of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that his discharge was in-
valid and an order restoring him to his position. The district court dis-
missed the complaintOa The court of appeals affirmed4 and certiorari
was granted.6 The Supreme Court of the Umted States, holding that
petitioner's dismissal was not authorized by the Summary Suspension Act
of 1950 and thus in violation of the Veterans' Preference Act, reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district
court 6
The Summary Suspension Act of 1950 authorizes disnssals upon a
determination by the heads of certain enumerated agencies that such dis-
missals are "necessary or advisable in the interest of the national secur-
ity."17 The term "national security," said the Supreme Court, is used in a
limited sense and relates only to those activities which are directly con-
cerned with the nation's safety as distinguished from its general welfare.
The court stressed that no determination was made that petitioner's posi-
tion was affected with the "national security" as used in the Act of 1950.
Consequently the dismissal was not authorized by the act. Therefore,
petitioner's discharge was in violation of the Veterans' Preference Act
which forbids the suspension of any preference-eligible veteran except
158 STAT. 390 (1944), 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952).
264 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 22-1, 22-3 (1952).
"Cole v. Young, 125 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1954).
'Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
'Cole v. Young, 350 U.S. 900 (1955).
'Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
764 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952).
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for such cause as "will promote the efficiency of the service," and pro-
vides a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
In a strong dissenting opinion three justices disagreed with the in-
terpretation placed by th majority on the language and legislative history
of the Act of 1950. These justices vigorously asserted that the plain meaning
of the words in the act and the legislative history make the act applicable
to any civilian employee or officer, not merely those in a sensitive posi-
tion. In addition, the majority was rebuked for "intruding itself into
presidential policy making" by "striking down the most effective weapon
against subversive activity available to the Government."8
In the absence of statutes, all employees of the executive departments
or agencies may be discharged at the discretion of the Chief Executive.9
The Congress, however, has the power to limit the boundaries of that dis-
cretion. By vwme of Congress' power to pass all laws "necessary and
proper" for carrying into execution the powers which the Constitution
confers on the government, it may create an officeO As an incident to
the power to establish an office Congress may also determine the quali-
fications of the officer, and in that manner limit the range of the Execu-
tive power. Prior to 1939 the problem of the loyalty of government em-
ployees was entirely under the scrutiny of the Executive. In 1939, Con-
gress passed the Hatch Act making it unlawful for any person employed
by the federal government "to have membership in any political party or
organization which advocates the overthrow of our Constitutional form
of Government in the United States.""i Since then, the congressional and
executive powers have worked together to establish a personnel security
system to remove those persons who through disloyalty or for other rea-
sons prove dangerous to the government. There are three classes of civil
service employees: (1) classified- those required to take a competitive
examination, (2) policy-determimng employees, and (3) excepted em-
ployees-those for whom it is not practical to examine or for whom a
non-competitive examination may be prescribed. 2  Two personnel se-
curity programs are applied to these three classes. Disloyal employees
may be dismissed under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations (ap-
plied only to classified employees) or in the discretion of the Executive
(applied to excepted and policy-determinng positions). If deemed ad-
visable in the interest of national security any employee may be sum-
'Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 569 (1956).
'Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
"U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, d. 18; see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.52 (1926).
"53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118 (Supp. III, 1955).
'5 C.F.R. § 06.2 (Supp. 1956)
(D)ecembe~r
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marly dismissed under the program formulated by the Summary Suspen-
sion Act1 3 and Executive Order 10450.14
The Summary Suspension Act was enacted to:
. increase the authority of the heads of Government departments en-
gaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend employees considered to
be bad security risks, and to terminate their services if subsequent mvesti-
gaton develops facts which support such action '
Before 1950 there was no effective way to remove an employee who,
although loyal, was dangerously indiscreet. A great need was felt for
legislation authorizing agency heads to remove such a security risk. Legis-
lative history indicates that the Summary Suspension Act was designed
to fill that gap. The House Commiee on Post Office and Civil Service
in a report on the Act of 1950 said:
The bill does not deal with the suspension or removal of disloyal Fed-
eral employees. Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947, establishes
procedures under which employees who are found to be disloyal are re-
moved from the Federal Government. This bill is concerned with the all-
important problem of dealing with those Federal employees who, although
loyal to the United States, act in a manner which jeopardizes national
security, either through wanton carelessness or general disregard for the
public good.'
That the various executive departments were of the same opinion is
evidenced in this statement by Dan Kimball, Under-Secretary of Navy-
The Department of Defense, so long as Executive Order No. 9835 is in
effect, would prosecute disloyal cases pursuant to that Executive order. It
is the intention of the Department of Defense, in order to protect the best
interests of national security, to use the authority in the proposed legisla-
non for the summary suspension and termination of the employment of
personnel who are security risks 7
The actual wording of the act also indicates that its application is to
be limited to security risks. Had Congress intended to include all gov-
ernment agencies and employees it would not have limited the act to
eleven specific agencies. It must be noted that of the eleven departments
eight are concerned with military operations or weapons development,'
1264 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. S5 22-1, 22-3 (1952).
1'18 FED, REG. 2489 (1953).
15. REP. No. 2158, 81st CONG., 2d SEss. 2 (1950).
" H. R. REP. No. 2330, 81st CONG., 2d Sass. 4 (1950).17H. R. REP. No. 2330, 81st CONG., 2d Sass. 6 (1950).
'Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Army, Depart-
ment of Navy, Department of Air Force, Coast Guard, National Security Resources
Board, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
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and the other three with international relations,19 internal security20 and
the stock-piling of strategic materials.2'
Also indicative of the narrow scope which Congress intended for the
act is the provision which allows a dismissed security risk to obtain work
in another executive department if he is determined suitable by the Civil
Service Commission. Such a provision would have no meaning if the
legislative intent was that the act should apply to all departments.
It must be recognized that the procedure of summary dismissal is a
harsh one and bites deeply into individual rights. Where an employee
is in a position in which he might harm the United States during the
delay of an investigation and hearing, summary procedures are justified.
But, until the legislative intent clearly dictates so, the extension of such
procedures to individuals who are not in such vital positions'ls unwar-
ranted. If such an extension was intended in this act it was not clearly
demonstrated. The Supreme Court wisely refused to imply a curtailment
of individual rights.
Such analysis can lead logically to but one conclusion- the Summary
Suspension Act of 1950 applies only to se'sztwe agencies and positions.
Perhaps the best statement of the scope of the Act of 1950 was voiced
by Congressman McCarthy in the House of Representatives.
When we passed Public Law 733, it was not contemplated that the
authority given under that act would ever be extended to include all Gov-
ernment employees. We looked upon it as rather specialized legislation,
applying to sensitive agencies.
To implement the Summary Suspension Act, Executive Order 10450
was issued by President Eisenhower.2a This order, however, deviated
from its statutory basis. Instead of providing that an employee may be
dismissed when it is deemed "necessary and advisable" Executive Order
10450 provides for his summary dismissal whenever his employment is
"not clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." The
latter standard affords less protection for individual rights than that
promulgated by Congress. A person may be dismissed under Executive
Order 10450 upon information that is sufficient to "cause a reasonable
doubt" as to loyalty but not sufficient to render the dismissal "necessary
or advisable." In addition, the blanket extension of Executive Order
10450 to all agencies and departments of the government was unauthor-
ized and invalid. The President was authorized to extend the Act of
1950 to such other departments of the government as he might "deem
" Department of State.
'Department of Justice.
"Atomic Energy Commission.
299 CONG. REc. 4525 (1953)
" 18 Fn. R G. 2489 (1953).
[December
RECENT DECISIONS
necessary in the best interests of national security."24 A limitation on
the President's discretion was dearly indicated in the majority opinion:
the character of the named agencies indicates the character of the deter-
minaton required to be made to effect such an extension.
This provision simply gives the President the authority to add to the list
of "sensitive" agencies compiled by Congress. Only an unreasonable in-
terpretation of the term "sensitive" could embrace all the agencies and
departmens of the executive branch.
Because it authorized an invalid extension and applied a different
standard of loyalty, Executive Order 10450 was properly struck down by
the Supreme Court of the Unted States.26
Contrary to the fears expressed by the dissenting justices and others,
the decision in Cole v. Young has not brought about great changes in the
federal loyalty program. 27 All potentially dangerous employees -secur-
ity risk or disloyal-may be dismissed under emsting procedures.2s  If
merely disloyal, classified employees may be dismissed by virtue of the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Disloyal policy-determining and
excepted employees may be dismissed in the discretion of the Execu-
tive 29 or possibly under the provisions of a revitalized Executive Order
9835.30 On the other hand, if a classified, excepted or policy-determin-
ing employee is dangerous enough to be termed a "security risk" he may
be summarily suspended under the Act of 1950.
Recently, the federal government decided to reinvestigate all dismis-
sals under Executive Order 10450 and determine if such dismissals were
in accordance with the decision in Cole v. Young. The rehiring and even
the re-investigation of such cases presents a massive practical problem.
Although the deterrent effects of this decision will be great, it is submit-
ted that they did not and will not outweigh the beneficial effects. In
the opinion of this writer the Supreme Court has balanced the conflict-
ing interests of individual rights and governmental self-preservation.
WILLIAM J. SCHAFER III
2164 STAT. 477 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-3 (1952).
nCole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 545 (1956).
The dissenting justices, contending that the summary dismissal of any employee
might be sustained under the grant of executive power in Article II of the United
States Constitution, reprimanded the majority for not facing this constitutional ques-
tion. It is submitted that there is no basis for such an argument. Itis clear from the
face of the Executive Order that it was intended as an implementation of the Act of
1950.
' 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3349 (June 26, 1956).
Unless the individual is a veteran, and then compliance must be had with the Vet-
erans' Preference Act.
"Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
'It is not dear whether the striking down of Executive Order 10450 will revive
Executive Order 9835. By drawing an analogy to statutes, however, it seems reason-
able to presume that Executive Order 9835 will be revived.
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